Homogeneity and the illocutionary force of rejection

Homogeneity inferences arise whenever an assertion implies a universal positive (every/both) and its denial implies a universal negative (no/neither). I present an account of homogeneity inferences based on two assumptions which together constrain the behavior of negation: rejection is non-classical, and vacuous models may be omitted (Neglect Zero). If both assumptions are enforced, the only definable negatives are universal (no/neither), predicting the homogeneity gap

Epistemic Modality and Coordination under Uncertainty

Communication facilitates coordination, but coordination might fail if there's too much uncertainty. I discuss a scenario in which vagueness-driven uncertainty undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then show that asserting an epistemic modal sentence, 'Might p', can reveal the speaker's uncertainty, and that this may improve the chances of coordination despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. This provides a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic modality. The account draws on a standard relational semantics for epistemic modality, Stalnaker's theory of assertion as informative update, and a Bayesian framework for reasoning under uncertainty.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2021, arXiv:2106.1088

On the Origin of Negation

The ability to express negation in language may have been the result of an adaptive process. However, there are different accounts of adaptation in linguistics, and more than one of them may describe the case of negation. In this paper, I distinguish different versions of the claim that negation is adaptive and defend a proposal, based on recent work by Steinert-Threlkeld (2016) and Incurvati and Sbardolini (2021), on which negation is an indirect adaptation

Aboutness Paradox

The present work outlines a logical and philosophical conception of propositions in relation to a group of puzzles that arise by quantifying over them: the Russell-Myhill paradox, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, and Prior's Theorem. I begin by motivating an interpretation of Russell-Myhill as depending on aboutness, which constrains the notion of propositional identity. I discuss two formalizations of of the paradox, showing that it does not depend on the syntax of propositional variables. I then extend to propositions a modal predicative response to the paradoxes articulated by an abstraction principle for propositions. On this conception, propositions are “shadows” of the sentences that express them. Modal operators are used to uncover the implicit relation of dependence that characterizes propositions that are about propositions. The benefits of this approach are shown by application to other intensional puzzles. The resulting view is an alternative to the plenitudinous metaphysics of impredicative comprehension principles

Sui controesempi al Modus Ponens

In McGee (1985) si presentano tre controesempi al modus ponens (MP), e si argomenta di come esistano restrizioni alla validità di questa regola deduttiva. Nel presente articolo, intendo ridiscutere questi tre controesempi a MP mostrando perché non colgono il bersaglio, e presentare altri casi in cui l'applicazione di MP non sembra efficace.In [McGee, 1985] si presentano 3 controesempi al modus ponens (MP), e si argomenta di come esistano restrizioni alla validità di questa regola deduttiva. Nel presente articolo, intendo ridiscutere questi 3 controesempi a MP mostrando perché non colgono il bersaglio, e presentare altri casi in cui l'applicazione di MP non sembra efficace

Who's afraid of common knowledge?

Some arguments against the assumption that ordinary people may share common knowledge are sound. The apparent cost of such arguments is the rejection of scientific theories that appeal to common knowledge. My proposal is to accept the arguments without rejecting the theories. On my proposal, common knowledge is shared by ideally rational people, who are not just mathematically simple versions of ordinary people. They are qualitatively different from us, and theorizing about them does not lead to predictions about our behavior. Nevertheless, models of action that assume common knowledge have a role to play in our understanding of collective rationality

On Hierarchical Propositions

There is an apparent dilemma for hierarchical accounts of propositions, raised by Bruno Whittle (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 215–231, 2017): either such accounts do not offer adequate treatment of connectives and quantifiers, or they eviscerate the logic. I discuss what a plausible hierarchical conception of propositions might amount to, and show that on that conception, Whittle’s dilemma is not compelling. Thus, there are good reasons why proponents of hierarchical accounts of propositions (such as Russell, Church, or Kaplan) did not see the difficulty Whittle raises